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Introduction:
Making Sense of Health Care
Health care… Or rather should it be healthcare? Is the term capitalized
or hyphenated? Ubiquitous in policy debate, health care is relevant and
familiar to almost all residents of economically advanced nations. Despite this
fact, what health care essentially means and entails is oftentimes vague and
varies between different nations. By the conclusion of these pages I will
elucidate commonly misunderstood concepts. Additionally, I will analyze one
of the specific changes in policy occurring currently in the United States; the
transition from Pay per Service (PPS) to Pay-for-Performance (P4P)
reimbursement. And by the way, health care and healthcare are both
acceptable.
This thesis begins with a walk through the aspects of medicine familiar
to most - well understood by few. In my initial thesis proposal, many of the
critiques I received were about the thesis being ‘too political.’ The scientific
rigor of my methods and statistical analysis were well received. Even the
ethical analysis through the lenses of Kant and John Stuart Mill received
praise. However, I could not quite understand why I could not escape the
perception that I was “Debating Obamacare” or advocating for a politically
hot topic. An exposé on Obamacare could likely have made it through the
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Selection Committee. However, Gavin Keulks, the Honors Program Director,
repeatedly made the differences between a persuasive essay and a Thesis
clear.
“Absurd.” I thought, tossing and turning awake at night, upset at the
prospect of another revision. “This is about Pay-for-Performance. Not
Obamacare. Not Romneycare. This is about whether aligning incentives yields
results.” Lacing my frustrations with expletives, I came to the conclusion that
there is a degree to where any paper on health care will have political
ramifications. Similarly so, any paper on economics and the economy will
have comparable effects. This is not because the fields of health care and
economics are overtly political, but because their subject matter is closely tied
to how humans govern themselves. The notion holds especially true in
affluent, advanced economies. I was personally pleased with my revelation;
certainly not every scientist studying climate change was a “tree-huggingfossil-fuel-hating-Prius-driving-liberal” set out to damage the American way.”
“Obamacare-pusher.” Still in bed, I could hear the critique being
shouted at me by the Honors Committee. In the nightmare, I was imagining
myself sitting at an oak desk, looking up at the committee towering, perched
atop a semi-circular panel. Sitting in a hollow room, an off-white paint on the
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walls trying in vain to portray a semblance of warmth in a room cold and
sterile.
“What about the Death Panels?” I imagined them drilling.
“If my thesis is unacceptable… then I hope I’m their next victim.”
Slowly it became apparent my thesis could not simply be a statistical
analysis of the effectiveness of Value-Based Purchasing. It could, but it
wouldn’t be understood. Although the statistical analysis is still included,
more depth was needed to prevent the relationship between Pay-forPerformance and Patient Satisfaction from erroneously digressing into an
extension of the political fodder that saturates American policy discussion in
the 24-hour news cycle. To do this, I had to start from the beginning.
First of all, health care is separate from, but not independent of
medicine. Medicine is an applied science, and it is one of the few sciences that
can claim its advent preceded the invention of the written word

[1]

. Before

man first began inscribing his thoughts into stone, he was cutting out plates in
the skull in a procedure known as trepanning [1].
Trepanning was the earliest surgical procedure known to have
occurred, being first performed 8,000 to 10,000 years ago [1]. Thought to cure
headaches, evidence of the procedure has been found in small missing
sections in skull remains found in skeletons carbon-dated to the period. By
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the lamellar bone deposition in some of the ancient skulls found proves the
holes were not intended to be fatal [1].
Even though it was shamans and healers, not medical doctors, that
performed surgeries in ancient times, the inception of medicine in antiquity
perhaps gives a slight insight into human nature. Tools designed to heal and
cure various afflictions have been unearthed by archaeologists from all over
the world—from different cultures, in different places, at different times.
While medicine is the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease; its
ubiquity demonstrates an ingenuity and compassion for members of our
fellow species that motivates us to find cures for our varying afflictions.
The notion of any science being rooted in emotions such as empathy
and compassion may seem counterintuitive, but is genuinely an inseparable
part of the field. Today, the interaction between the science of medicine,
compassion, and empathy is most-easily recognized through what is
commonly referred to as the Hippocratic Oath. Created by the Greek scholar
Hippocrates (or one of his scholars) in around 400 B.C.

[2]

, the oath provides

the framework that relates the practice of medicine to morality and the goals
of the field.



Lamellar bone deposition occurs during the healing process, after bone
breakage or damage [1].
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In reality, modern medical practitioners do not recite the original Oath
because of its allusions to the Greek gods, but rather recite the Declaration of
Geneva. It was established in 1948 [2]. Below is the most current version of the
Declaration of Geneva.
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of
humanity. I will give to my teachers the respect and gratitude
which is their due; I will practice my profession with conscience
and dignity; the health of my patient will be my first
consideration; I will respect the secrets which are confided in me;
I will maintain by all means in my power the honor and noble
traditions of the medical profession; my colleagues will be my
brothers; I will not permit considerations of religion, nationality,
race, party, politics, or social standing to intervene between my
duty and my patient; I will maintain the utmost respect for
human life, from the time of conception; even under threat, I will
not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.
I make these promises solemnly, freely, and upon my honor. [3]
The oath asserts the mission of medical practitioners and the
mission of the field in general, but the oath is voluntary. Governments can
establish their own laws around the conduct, but the Declaration of Geneva
does not grant authority to any specific regulatory body

[2]

. In the United

States; federal laws, state laws, and various medical board associations
regulate physician conduct and potential abuse. Additionally, citizens can
file civil lawsuits against physicians for alleged medical malpractice. Reciting
an oath may verbalize the mission of a field, but it does not exempt
practitioners from human error.
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Despite the serious tone of the Declaration of Geneva, it doesn’t
confer any tangible authority. It is worth noting that it stands as the only
declaration of its type in the scientific field (e.g. there is no such declaration
for scientists and research in the physical, biological and chemical sciences).
Proposals for other sciences have been made and brought before the G8
summit before, but no such declaration currently exists

[4]

. In conclusion,

medicine is a field of science; different from all other scientific fields
because of its inherent moral responsibility towards other people. Because
of this tie, there is room for criticism something along the lines of “should
we cure and treat this person?” In health care, the question is not asked.
The field does not differentiate such questions, only asking if it is possible
to treat a patient. To try to pin the industry itself, however, as belonging to
any certain political ideology would be a fallacy. Democrats and
Republicans get sick.
Health care, differing from medicine, is an economic industry.
According to the fourth revision of the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) of all economic activities, health care encompasses
hospital activities; medical and dental practice activities; and other human



G8 (group of 8) Summit is an annual gathering of the heads of the governments of
France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada where
various international agreements are discussed.
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health activities

[5]

. The ISIC is produced by the United Nations and acts as

an interface between global policies in economics, social, and
environmental action. Essentially, the ISIC provides International Standards
for how data from specific economic activities are compiled. For example,
under §Q.8610 of the 4th Revision, “Hospital Activities” includes: activities
related to all hospital inpatients, but excludes laboratory testing [5].
The importance of the ISIC becomes clearer when comparing health
care and health systems from one country to another (to be discussed in
Part One). However, from the ISIC we can learn health care is categorized
alongside economic activities such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
real estate, public administration, arts, entertainment, education, financial
activities, and real estate activities [5].
Physicians and health practitioners, a majority of whom have taken
the Declaration of Geneva Oath stating their own personal, noble
intentions, administer health care. They are the functional units of the
health system that carry out its economic services. Health care is a cog in
the economy and subject to the same pressures and realities that all
economic activities face, specifically the reality that the system has to make
its financial ends meet to assure current and future viability.
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If medicine were autonomous and independent from health care,
every sick person would be treated for their ailments, and given the
absolute best treatment modern science had established. However, one
cannot ignore the practical ramifications of not living in a perfect, ideal
society. Practitioners still need to make money, earn a living, perhaps raise
a family and participate in the economy. Doctors have student loans from
the high cost of medical school, mortgages, and families just as other
citizens do. Saving lives has an economic cost, and that is where Pay for
Performance aims to step in and align incentives to work for all parties.
You will find in these pages varying analyses on a very minor portion
of Health Care reform; Pay for Performance (P4P) or Value-Based
Purchasing (VBP). The stage will be set, the problem elucidated, the varying
impacts of the policies, a comparison of other countries, and a statistical
analysis. The document will not judge “Obamacare,” chiefly because the
Pay-for-Performance policy shift predates his administration. The policy
and its aims are discussed. The bill’s value, worth, effectiveness,
unforeseen consequences and things of that nature at this point are
functionally speculative because the law has not been implemented (at the
time of writing) enough to quantitatively assess.
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Part One
What is Pay-for-Performance and Value-Based Purchasing?
Pay for Performance (P4P) and Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) are two
separate names for the same thing. Both aim to spend money based on
outcomes, instead of being based on services or treatments rendered. In the
writing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), the term
that is used is Value-Based Purchasing. This thesis avoids political
connotations, but I assume VBP sounded better to the bill’s writers and the
politicians involved in shaping the bill and its many revisions. The difference in
preference is wholly semantic. I use P4P and VBP interchangeably.
The concept of Pay for Performance is a paradigm shift within the
United States health system. Prior to passage of the PPACA, hospitals and
insurers negotiated reimbursement contracts for health services rendered,
regardless of the necessity or quality of said services. For example, Hospital A
might negotiate a contract with Insurance Company A, where Insurance
Company A would reimburse Hospital A for 75% of all medical costs that
Hospital A bills for patients covered for Insurance Company A. And Hospital B,
a smaller hospital with a lower market share, negotiates a contract with the
same Insurance Company A where 72% of all costs incurred by covered
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patients of Insurance Company A are reimbursed. This is what is known as Pay
Per Service (PPS).
PPS creates an incentive for hospitals to have patients in the hospital
longer. Consider this example; two patients are admitted to the hospital with
identical symptoms and illnesses. Patient A is given outstanding care and is
discharged in two days, while patient B is given average care and spends 5
days in the hospital. Because hospitals are not reimbursed for the outstanding
care given to Patient A, they ultimately will bring in more revenue from
Patient B. There is an incentive to give average care because the hospital will
take in more revenue for the additional services rendered over the extra 3
days Patient B spent in the hospital. Every hospital will aim for high quality of
care in its mission, but the PPS paradigm presents hospitals with the option of
giving high quality care and making less money; but bringing in more revenue
by giving not-as-stellar care [1][2][3].
Pay for Performance, amongst other things, aims to eliminate the
financial disincentive found when administrators give high quality of care for
the patient. In the model, reimbursements and payments are linked to the
value (defined by quality and efficiency) of care provided; joint accountability
between physicians and providers for the quality and financial fairness in the
health care provided; evidence-based care that is outcomes-driven to better
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manage diseases and prevent complications; increased transparency of
quality, cost, and safety of health care given; and the transition to electronic
health records [2].
The P4P model creates performance assessment protocols to score a
hospital’s performance on a specified set of measures, where the scores
would then be used as a Total Performance Score in allocation of payments
based on an incentivized scale

[1]

. Despite this, P4P is not intended to be the

only purchasing plan available. Each disease is unique in its characterization
and pathology, and similarly so, there are different plans tailored to varying
illnesses. P4P is most effectively applied in the evaluation of preventable
disease, hospital infections, medication errors, surgical-site infections, and
other services that are preventable in the hospital setting when quality and
attentive care is given

[5]

. Simply, when applied medical science advances

treatment systems and methodologies of a specific ailment or illness to the
point where said ailment is preventable, P4P is claimed to be a way to ensure
sustainable treatment [5].
Developing systems to quantitatively reduce preventable conditions is
important for expanding P4P because of its inherent limitations. If a patient is
sick and at the end of their life and there are no effective treatments
available, a hospital should not be reimbursed through a P4P plan because the

13

services rendered were the best medical science has proven to be able to
offer. Some hospitals serve populations of people that are extremely ill, dying,
or from a low socioeconomic status, so withholding payments or
reimbursement because a hospital wasn’t able to meet its contracted
“outcomes” would no longer incentivize the interest of patients and hospitals
[2][3][5]

. While there is room for expansion, P4P can only be used for conditions

that are hospital acquired, preventable, and/or a result of any form of
negligence.
In terms of financial viability and transparency, skeletons of the PPS
purchasing paradigm have begun to surface as the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services have released information regarding how much they pay
for various procedures. In a New York Times article published in May 2013,
“Hospital Billing Varies Wildly, Government Data Shows,” costs for medical
procedures were compared in various places across the country [6].
In Saint Augustine, FL, one hospital typically billed nearly
$40,000 to remove a gallbladder using minimally invasive
surgery, while one in Orange Park, FL, charged $91,000 [6].
The report, from a public relations standpoint, was damning for providers of
health care. The article compares costs across the country, and costs varying
within individual cities. There is somewhat of an explanation for average
prices varying between cities due to different costs of living. However, the
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correlation isn’t precise in the case, and it still makes it hard to discern which
costs are apples and which are oranges when drawing the comparisons
between health costs in different domestic locations. Of more interest,
however, are the comparisons between hospitals in the same geographic
area. Why should a procedure cost thousands of dollars more if the only
difference is a few blocks distance between where the procedure is
performed?
The answer is Pay Per Service. Using the payment model, when
hospitals needed to increase revenue, for whatever reason, hospitals and
administrators would increase the cost of their procedures. They would
increase the cost of a feeding tube on the billing sheet, or the daily cost of an
inpatient stay. Doctors who want or need to bring in additional revenue do
similar things. What happens is each hospital, in an attempt to parry their
own administrative costs, increase the amount they bill for procedures.
Because contracts traditionally have been established based on the PPS
purchasing plan, administrators know purchasers will reimburse a certain
amount of the bill, regardless of ‘fairness’ of prices

[1][2][5][6]

. There are other

factors taken into consideration as well; some hospitals may be teaching
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hospitals; critical access hospitals, or the hospital may care for sicker
patients overall. However, alternative reasons do not detract from the
financial incentive of health care providers to inflate prices to meet overhead
costs.
Establishing protocols and procedures to establish efficient protocols
for scoring and evaluating providers is an aim of P4P because it links efficiency
and quality. When Hospital A can achieve the same patient outcomes and
patient satisfaction as Hospital B (hospitals located 15 miles apart) for a
procedure at a lower price, purchasers can then establish Hospital B did not
give efficient care. Price slashing without sacrificing quality is rewarded in
bonuses, and price inflation is assessed [1][2].
There are concerns about P4P, however. In considering the paradigm
shift, it must be evaluated how all parties are affected. How does P4P affect
doctors, hospital administrators, taxpayers, insurance providers, nurses,
support staff, patients, and all other parties affected by the economic activity
known as health care? Typically, policy changes shift burdens and
responsibilities previously held by one group on to another group.
Before implementing P4P, purchasers have to answer whether or not
communities are ready for the changes. Does P4P target minorities and the


Critical access hospitals are rural, acute-care hospitals that are eligible for costbased reimbursement by Medicare based on either State designation as a
“necessary provider” or distance from nearest acute-care facility [5].
16

socioeconomically disadvantaged
targeted by the plans first

[5]

[4][5][7]

? Should hospitals or physicians be

? Should participation be mandatory or

voluntary? Should there be punishments and rewards, or only rewards

[5]

?

When creating the performance criteria, should hospitals be held to absolute
or relative performance thresholds? How should the system be evaluated?
How should the system be structured for phasing in and sustainability?
These questions do not have the current evidence to be completely
answered. Many of the concerns will be addressed in the final Part of this
thesis, where more attention can be spent on the finer details. This section
only serves to elucidate the general principle of P4P and its aims. A more
thorough discussion of its effectiveness, flaws, benefits, and practical
implementation will be discussed later on.
The next Parts of the thesis address some of the overarching structures
and functional aspects of health care systems in America and other countries.
They also address why reforms have been part of the American policy debate,
the changes in Obamacare, and the structure and effective parts of health
care systems in other countries.
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Part Two
The Stage: How Our Health Care System Ranks
If it isn’t broken, don’t fix it - a simple, yet important phrase. If the
United States Government didn’t feel its health care system’s economic
viability was threatened, or if the system was performing adequately, minor
health care reforms like Pay-for-Performance could occur. On the other hand,
history would suggest unless a large problem existed, reform of the
magnitude of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010,
commonly referred to as Obamacare, simply would not happen. So how,
exactly, did the United States Government come to conclude its health system
needed reform?
The answer, in part, relates to the International Standard Industrial
Classification of All Economic Activities. Without the ISIC, comparing one
country to another in terms of medical care would be apples to oranges. By
using the ISIC as a guide to governments in the compilation of economic data
and statistics, governments have the ability to accurately compare data
compiled from nations with different health care systems and laws [1].
Using the ISIC data for different economic activities (e.g. health care),
data can be compiled and rankings comparing countries established. In the
year 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked the United States
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health care system 37th overall globally [2]. The rankings were compiled based
on disability-adjusted life expectancy; health equality in terms of child
survival; responsiveness level; responsiveness distribution; fairness of
financial contribution; performance on level of health and overall health
system performance [3].
The table at the top of the following page is taken from the World
Health Organization’s report in the year 2000, where all countries have their
health systems ranked according to the criteria of the World Health
Organization for what makes a good health system [2][3].

Table 1 – Portion of Annex table 1 of year 2000 World Health Organization’s World Health Report:
Health Systems: Improving Performance (page 155).

Based on the table, The United States is the best in the world for the
level of responsiveness of our health system. Where the US falters is
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disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE), distribution of care and
performance on the level of health.
The population of Americans without health insurance accounts for the
United States’ low rankings in DALE and distribution. Similarly so, those who
must pay out of pocket, or lack insurance, bring down the rankings for
performance on the level of health because the rankings are assessed for
performance for the poorest levels of society. The rest of the thesis will
examine more in-depth the Americans lacking insurance, and the impact they
have on the country’s health system, but the main takeaway is that other
countries who provide universal health care (by whatever means) fare better
in the WHO’s system overall.
The ranking of 37th, however, is somewhat dubious. For example, The
United States ranks low in “Fairness of contribution.” This metric used in the
overall evaluation does not necessarily reflect each country’s value system.
There is an argument to be made certainly that every person should be
accountable for his or her own health insurance, and it should not be a
responsibility of the wealthier citizens of a country to pay a larger proportion
of the costs of the system. “Fairness” is a metric that is open to criticism, and
for that reason the WHO’s report has received criticism, including from a
former editor, Dr. Philip Musgrove.
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Dr. Musgrove argues that many variables involved in the computation
of the figures aren’t reliable enough to confer reliability in overall rankings.
According to Dr. Musgrove:
“The number 37 is meaningless, but it continues to be cited, for
four reasons. First, people would like to trust the WHO and
presume that the organization must know what it is talking
about. Second, very few people are aware of the reason why in
this case that trust is misplaced, partly because the explanation
was published 3 years after the report containing the ranking.
Third, numbers confer a spurious precision, appealing even to
people who have no idea where the numbers came from. Finally,
those persons responsible for the number continue to peddle it
anyway…Analyzing the failings of health systems can be
valuable; making up rankings among them is not. It is long past
time for this zombie number to disappear from circulation.” [4]
Dr. Musgrove does not denounce the report itself, just the overall rankings.
The data contained does highlight areas where the United States does not
perform as highly as other countries, and areas where the United States
performs better.
Another frequent criticism is the favoring of “socialized medicine” by
the World Health Organization. Journalist John Stossel notes, “a country with
high-quality care overall but ‘unequal distribution’ would rank below a
country with lower quality care but equal distribution” [5].
A link between health care systems and the values of a country is
inseparable, especially in democratic societies. I don’t focus on values for this
exact reason. The consensus is too hard to reach, and the effectiveness of
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appealing to virtue with rhetoric simply not quantifiably justifiable. However,
the United States does quantifiably spend more on health care as a share of
GDP compared to every country it was ranked alongside in the WHO report.
Health Care, as a field, does not assert itself into politics. It simply aims
to improve privacy, quality, access, fairness, and responsiveness of the
systems. There are real problems, and the lack of distribution of health care in
many countries does cause countless preventable illnesses and deaths from
those illnesses. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the noble
advancement of the health care field and its aims cannot be addressed. I will
not appeal to any value system, or comment on which is preferable because
in the end there simply is no need as far as P4P is concerned.
Regardless of how one values access, quality, and fairness, other
advanced nations and economies do provide health care for more people, at
the same quality (or better), and do it for less than in the United States of
America. The World Health Organization aims to advance the field of health
care and to provide data that can help improve the quality of life for people
around the globe; an admirable disposition to be sure, but not appropriate for
this thesis because of my aversion to qualitative and anecdotal data.
Quantitatively, the United States pays more for the same medications
and procedures. The United States insures a lower proportion of its
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population compared to other advanced economies; has a higher number of
bankruptcies due to health care costs; and delivers lower quality of care
overall when gauged by our own expectations [6]. Without comparing America
to other nations, we still unnecessarily injure hundreds of thousands of
patients by medical mistakes every year

[6]

. In fact, the Center for Disease

Control estimates 90,000 people in America die annually from hospital
acquired infections alone. VBP aims to incentivize and/or penalize those kinds
of preventable mistakes.
Value-Based Purchasing and Pay-for-Performance measures, however,
are not designed to be Silver Bullets for the aforementioned woes of the
American Health Care System. The measures are designed to align incentives
and cut costs, while improving health care. Their effectiveness is discussed in
later sections of the thesis, but the next two sections deal with health care
systems around the world, and the legislation commonly known as
“Obamacare.” Including these sections wasn’t necessary, but were provided
as a general resource and quick summary of health care systems and the
legislation.
The next two Parts of the thesis attempt to separate misconceptions
about our own health care system because of its complicated nature. Where
other countries ranked higher in the WHO have set systems, the United States
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health system channels the models used in other countries in a patchwork
fashion, covering certain populations and omitting others. Additionally, there
is a section on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, which
elucidates much of the misinformation I have heard about the legislation
since I began researching and talking about my thesis to others.
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Part Three
How the World Pays for Health Care (And America too)
Problems with the United States Government’s system of health care
were discussed in the previous section. In short, the United States Federal
Government spends more on health care as a percentage of GDP and also per
capita than any other country. The return on the investment is lower overall
quality than what other developed nations deliver to their respective citizens.
In short, The United States spends more on health care but receives lower
quality of care [1].
In order for governments to align the costs of health care with the
quality of care received, governments must find ways to lower spending
without sacrificing quality. However, no matter how much the cost of care is
lowered, someone will be left with a bill. The essential differentiator between
the world’s health care systems is who takes responsibility for the bill once
medical care has been received. This section will address four different basic
models of health care from around the world, and will also touch on how the
systems relate to health care in America.
Discussing different models of healthcare is somewhat tricky. The
health care model in each country is a reflection of their economy, national
values, and political system. For example, Americans are not typically
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characterized as patient people, so an egalitarian system where there are long
waiting times for treatment, but everyone is treated, as is the case in the
Canadian system, would probably not be the structure Americans would want
in their health care system. There is also the issue of national wealth. Poorer
countries, and rural areas of wealthier countries would surely benefit from
increased access to medical care, but lack the economic resources and wealth
to do so.

First System: The Out-of-Pocket Model [2]
Government health care systems are a modern invention. The Romans
did not provide universal health care to their citizens, nor did England in the
days of the British Empire. The quality of health care an average citizen in
those jurisdictions would receive was poor, evidenced by short life
expectancies roughly one half of what they are today

[3]

. However, the

governments themselves did not have to worry about the bureaucratic and
systemic problems associated with a health system. To relate to the United
States system, the long-term viability of Medicare and Medicaid would not be
a policy issue if the policies did not exist. Essentially, the first health care
system to be discussed is technically not a system at all, but a lack thereof
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where governments do not administer health care or reimburse health care
providers. This model is referred to as the Out-of-Pocket Model.
In this system, health care bills are the same as any other bill a person
may receive (e.g. restaurant bill, phone bill, etc.). This makes intuitive sense: if
the government isn’t paying anything, then the citizen is. There are
perceivable benefits to this. For one, nobody’s tax dollars are going to the
government for their own, or anyone else’s health care. The point is
subjective, however, as some people would like to be or would not mind to be
taxed to pay for a universal health system. This subjectivity is a natural
product in comparisons of health care systems because such systems are
reflections of national values and the politics associated with said values.
The Out-of-Pocket model of health care is the most common in the
world, though far from most popular. Only around 40 countries have systems
that are not the Out-of-Pocket model [2]. Most nations are either too poor or
disorganized to provide mass health care, and as a result the people who
receive the care are generally the ones that can afford it. There are places in
rural regions in India, China, Africa and South America where people may live
their whole lives without a trip to the doctor (more specifically, a doctor
trained in Western Medicine). A great number of traditional healers and/or
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village shamans still exist in the world, and they are reimbursed out of the
pockets of those they treat.
In the model, there is the simple economic reality that people who
cannot afford their treatment will be denied treatment; and only those who
can afford treatment will receive it. If you receive treatment, you are required
to pay. I experienced this firsthand in Kenya, working in St. Joseph’s Mission
Hospital where I was introduced to the concept of ‘Discharge In’ and
‘Discharge Out.’
Asante was a 5-year-old male when I arrived at St. Joseph’s. Both
parents had died in a motorbike accident while Asante was in the hospital
being treated for a hernia. Following the death of his parents and unable to
pay for the treatment he received, Asante was kept at St. Joseph’s after his
injuries had been cured in what is known as “discharge in” situation. A steel
fence surrounds St. Joseph’s Mission Hospital; entry and exit is only granted
with security clearance, so Asante was unable to leave the hospital grounds
until he had paid his medical bills, and would be kept until he was able to do
so.
The obvious problem was Asante was five years old. He could not gain
employment in a rural region where 80% of the residents lived on less than
the US equivalent of a dollar every day

[2]

. Additionally, the longer Asante
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stayed, the higher his bills were because he was still being billed for hospital
costs associated with keeping him, like food. For Asante, the hospital that
cured him trapped him in somewhat of an economic prison. Over the next
month, goats and chickens were donated to the hospital as St. Joseph’s tried
to solicit donations from towns-folk to help pay Asante’s medical bills. After a
few weeks, enough donations and animals had been raised to pay off Asante’s
bills, only then was he was released.
Asante’s circumstances are in a way both rare and common. Not too
often is a child orphaned while in a hospital. His parents could’ve paid his
medical bills, but without them the duty of paying for his treatment was on
him. However, Asante’s story shows that there is not much room for
compassion in Asante’s part of the world. For St. Joseph’s, patients would only
be admitted once the hospital felt confident they could pay, which is where
the advent of “discharge in” comes into play; patients who the hospital knows
can pay but haven’t are kept at the hospital until the bill is paid. There is no
“Bill Me Later” or “Send in Mail” option for most hospitals in countries lacking
an organized health system. There is no “Bill by Mail” option in the countless
parts of the world without a courier system and/or address system, as well.
The common part of Asante’s story is the economic prison he was in. In
America, the uninsured have to pay their medical bills out-of-pocket. For
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them, the cost of the bills themselves represents the prison. According to a
joint study by Harvard Medical School and Harvard Law School, 700,000
people annually file for bankruptcy because of an inability to pay their
medical bills

[2]

. The number is 0 in Britain, France, Japan, Germany, the

Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland

[4]

. Having the choice between medical

treatment and the ability to support oneself/ one’s family is a choice
uninsured Americans must make under the current health care system, which
is one reason why the United States was ranked 54th of 191 countries when
ranked on ‘fairness’ by the World Health Organization [3].
The Out-of-Pocket system currently could not be fully implemented in
America. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Within the pages of the bill is
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which
required hospitals to provide care to anyone needing emergency health care
treatment [5]. Regardless of citizenship, legal status, or ability to pay, hospitals
were required to give treatment. Ultimately, this bill made it illegal for
“participating hospitals” to implement an Out-of-Pocket system. Under the
bill, “participating hospitals” constitutes any hospital that receives any money
from Medicare, Medicaid, or the Department of Health and Human Services
[5]

.
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The stipulations of the EMTALA essentially ensures that the only
hospitals that could afford to not provide emergency medical care are forprofit hospitals, where there may be private insurance reimbursements, but
all patients are screened for the ability to pay, and any patient with only
Medicare/Medicaid will be turned away. More importantly, the EMTALA
alters who ultimately foots the bill for the emergency treatment administered
to those without insurance.
In a true Out-of-Pocket system, those who cannot afford treatment do
not receive it. This may strike some as morally wrong, but not others.
Remembering that health care systems are reflective of national values, it is
possible without EMTALA to structure the American health care system so
those who cannot afford health care will not receive it. However, with
EMTALA, those who cannot afford treatment do receive treatment, and the
EMTALA shifts the burdens of the cost of said treatment away from those
who cannot afford it. If a patient cannot afford treatment, is billed, can’t
afford the hospital bill and files for bankruptcy, the hospital still does not
receive reimbursement.
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Second System: Bismarck Model
In the 19th century, Otto von Bismarck unified Germany and Prussia,
becoming the First Chancellor of Germany

[6]

. As part of the unification,

Bismarck established the welfare state, and as part of the unification,
established a national health care system designed to benefit the workers of
Germany. At the time of unification, two main political parties existed:
socialists and conservatives. Bismarck’s policies were designed to protect the
workers of Germany without angering conservatives [6].
Bismarck’s way of proposing social-welfare based legislation that
would appeal to conservatives was to protect workers who had earned,
through their years, a certain amount of government assistance. His views are
expressed in his words promoting what he called Practical Christianity.
The real grievance of the worker is the insecurity of his
existence; he is not sure that he will always have work, he is
not sure that he will always be healthy, and he foresees that
he will one day be old and unfit to work. If he falls into poverty,
even if only through a prolonged illness, he is then completely
helpless, left to his own devices, and society does not
currently recognize any real obligation towards him beyond
the usual help for the poor, even if he has been working all the
time ever so faithfully and diligently. The usual help for the
poor, however, leaves a lot to be desired, especially in large
cities, where it is very much worse than in the country [7].
Conservatives in Germany at the time resented handouts that were, by
their point of view, undeserved. In the system, both health care providers and
payers of health care are private entities. Bismarck established private heath
32

insurance plans, financed jointly by employers and employees via payroll
reductions. Under the Health Insurance Bill of 1883, employers contributed
1/3 to the private insurance plans and 2/3 were contributed by the
employees[6].
Joint insurance coverage paid by both employers and employees is the
health care model that Americans under the age of sixty-five are familiar
with. However, the Bismarck model differs from America’s when it comes to
the actual insurance companies.
Insurance companies in the Bismarck model are not for profit, unlike
American insurance companies. The insurance companies in countries with
the Bismarck model are not-for-profit, and are required to cover everybody,
not just workers and their families

[2]

. The system is a multi-payer system,

which is different from the next two models to be discussed.
The system itself is not a silver bullet, however. To keep everyone
insured and health costs low, there is a tight regulation of services and fees.
Essentially, the Bismarck model makes the funding of health care private,
using a multi-payer model that controls its costs by fees and tight regulation
of services. In return, everyone in Germany is covered. The model is also used
in Japan, Switzerland, Belgium, and some areas in Latin America [2].
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Third System: Beveridge Model
The third model is named after Britain’s social reformer, William
Beveridge. Beveridge’s model is the basis of Britain’s National Health Service
[2]

. Differing from the multi-payer Bismarck model, the Beveridge model is

single-payer, and publicly financed. Taxes are collected by the government,
and in return are used to pay for and finance health care.
Britain treats its health care system the way America treats public
services such as police officers, firemen, libraries, etc. Under the system,
many hospitals, physicians, clinics, medical practitioners, etc. are either
employed or under the control of the government. However, there are still
private physicians who collect fees from the government.
One of the benefits Britain touts from their health care system is the
low per capita spending cost. Another key aspect of Britain’s system is that
the person receiving medical treatment does not ever receive a bill. Because
the British government is the sole payer of medical bills, it controls what
procedures doctors can perform and the amount they can charge for such
procedures. This system is closest to what may be thought of as “socialized
medicine” in America.
Controlling procedures and cost is something that may be
controversial. As British health minister John Reid said once, “We cover
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everybody, but we don’t cover everything.” These sorts of issues can create
an issue because it ultimately will tie a person’s life to the cost, effectiveness,
survival rate, expected years of prolonged life, and other factors. In the same
way an auto-insurer will weigh the cost of a 18-year old female driver to a 27
year old male with a DUI on his record, Britain decides what it will cover based
on the cost to society contrasted to its benefits. To give an example, a 97
year-old woman with breast cancer may not be given the same treatment a
40 year-old woman with the same disease would receive. The British
government and its system decide the 40 year-old’s life has more value to
society based on their own metrics, resigning the 97 year-old to hospice care
or an alternative form of end-of-life care.
While it may seem odd that an institution without any personal
knowledge of patients will make decisions about what health care they may
receive, the same thing occurs by private insurance companies in America.
Additionally, Native Americans, military personnel, and veterans are all part of
a system where they are covered by the government, are never billed, and
treated at government-owned facilities by government-employed physicians.
Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Cuba, Hong Kong and Scandanavia all use the
Beveridge model. Each country has their own personal twists to the system,
but the Beveridge model is the blueprint.
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The Fourth System: National Health Insurance Model
The National Health Insurance Model is a polymer of both the Bismarck
and Beveridge models. Health care providers are private, but the payer is a
government-run insurance program that is paid through taxation. This model
provides cheap, universal health care because there is a non-profit, single
payer for the services.
Where private insurance companies must factor in overhead costs like
corporate compensation, advertising, underwriting offices, etc., the non-profit
government insurance plan covers all, and saves administrative costs that are
unavoidable in private, competitive insurance markets (e.g. United States). An
added benefit to the single-payer comes with a concept known as ‘market
power,’ which enables the government to negotiate lower health care prices
because of all of the capital it has to invest.

The American System
America’s system has elements of each system of health care, but lacks
any of the cost-saving benefits. For the uninsured, it’s out-of-pocket aside
from care delivered in Emergency Departments under provisions contained
within EMTALA. For veterans, Native Americans, and military it is the
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Beveridge system. For those over 65, the American system resembles the
National Health Insurance model. Everyone else (working class) experiences a
health care model like the Bismarck system.
In America’s case, combining elements of all the health care models
has not improved quality of care, or cost of care. That is not to say America
has below-average health care. On the contrary, America has the most
technologically advanced and well-trained doctors in the world. However, the
best care is afforded to those who can afford such treatment, whereas the
statistics cited relate to the country as a whole.
Probably the biggest difference between America’s systems is that
medical insurance companies and agencies operate for profit. In the Bismarck,
National Health Insurance and Beveridge models, the payers do not operate
for profit. Whether it is the government via tax collection, private insurance
companies, or public insurance companies, they do not operate at profit.
Eleven United States health insurance companies are ranked in the
Fortune 500. Using data from 2012, these are; UnitedHealth Group (Fortune
500 rank #22), WellPoint (F500 #45), Humana (F500 #79), Aetna (F500 #89),
Cigna (F500 #130), Coverntry Health Care (F500 #219), Health Net (F500
#221), Amerigroup (F500 #385), WellCare Health Plans (F500 #401), Centene
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(F500 453), and Molina Healthcare (F500 #500)[8]. Combined, these
companies made 170 billion dollars (USD) in profits in 2012 alone [8].
While blaming Insurance companies, or trying to legislate a non-profit
health care insurance industry may seem like a silver bullet solution, it is only
one thing that increases the United States’ per capita spending on health care.
From the CIA fact book, the US GDP in 2010 was 14 trillion dollars. In the same
year, the US spent 17.9% of the GDP on health care.
The profits made from the Fortune 500 health care insurers were part
of the health care spending in the country. If these profits were not allowed,
the spending on health care, as a % of GDP would only shift from 17.6% of
GDP to 16.3% of GDP. Essentially,
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Part Four
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Obamacare
Health Care is a somewhat bitter, polarizing topic in American society.
While the World Health organization ranked the United States’ health care
system as 37th Overall in 2001, it was not the first time the health care system
was the subject in American policy debate. Former presidents George H.W.
Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all had various initiatives and proposals
during their presidencies; significant reform failed each time.
In 2008, Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) won the office of President of
the United States of America. He won 53% of the popular vote and defeated
Republican challenger John McCain by an electoral vote count of 365-173,
nearly 100 points above the 270 votes needed to secure a victory [2].
After the 2008 elections, the Democratic Party had majority control of
the House of Representatives, the Senate, and held the Executive Branch.
Using their majority, the 111th Congress, during their second session, passed
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; Public Law 111-148)[1].
This is the document/law popularly referred to as “Obamacare.”
This section covers the law itself, and what it entails. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is around 1000 pages, so the following
analysis covers many main points of the bill, but an in-depth analysis on the
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bill itself would be an entirely new thesis, possibly even a dissertation.
Regardless, over my last three years of work on this thesis the conversation
has, without fail, turned to the PPACA. Because of the great many
conversations I have had about the subject, most points addressed in the
section deal with points of contention within society, or common arguments
and concerns.
Keeping this in mind, I am not an economist. How some of the
legislature will affect various aspects of the markets and United States
economy is beyond my training and capacity. However, most of the
legislature’s intentions are clear in the bill, which are not hard to report.
Can you tell I’m treading lightly yet? Ultimately, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act was passed with the goal of improving access to
healthcare for millions more Americans, while decreasing per capita spending.
There are costs to all health care systems, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in the broadest of terms controls its cost through
regulations and a shift in where financial burdens are placed in comparison to
the American health system prior to the bills passage.
Lastly, there are a few versions of the bill on the Internet. It’s the same
law, but formatting differences between various versions online disables me
from citing specific page numbers. The citations in this section will be listed by
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sections of the bill, but all notations contained within the bill fall under the
version I read and analyzed

[1]

. There are over 10,000 sections in the bill,

categorized under 10 titles. Each of the 10 titles will be discussed to some
length, however, Title I, does receive a standalone section. Contained within
Title I of the PPACA are most of the reforms that alter the landscape of health
care in the country.
Legislation contained within Title I shifts a large percentage of our
citizens living by the “Out-of-Pocket” model to both the Bismarck and
Beveridge models. It maintains the private payer system, and private
insurance companies, but does not go as far as the Bismarck system as to
make private insurers essentially non-profit organizations. It does, however,
cap profits (more on this later). Additionally, the PPACA expands the
Beveridge aspect of the health care system through the expansion of
Medicare and Medicaid.
The rest of the Titles have important legislature, but they are mostly
regulations, reforms, protocols, and procedures: “nitty-gritty” aspects of the
law not entirely pertinent to the layman, and as such, my audience. Title III
will not be discussed in this Part of the thesis, because it deals specifically
with the question of my thesis: Value-Based Purchasing.
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After the roughly 30-page Table of Contents, the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 begins with Title I.

Title I—Quality, Affordable Health Care for All Americans

Title I begins with amendments to the Public Health Service Act that
redesign and reform the aforementioned act (§1001, Part A). The
amendments and reforms pave the road for the rest of the bill, parts that
would be in contrast with the Public Health Service Act.
Subpart II of Title I establishes a prohibition on lifetime and annual
limits to health care coverage (§2711). There is a transition period from group
health and insurance plans previously established, but effective Jan. 1, 2014
annual and lifetime limits are prohibited within group health and insurance
plans (§2711 (a)(2)). When this section of the law goes into full effect, a ban
on rescission of such plans will be in full effect (§2712). Essentially Sections
2711-2712 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act guarantee
consumer protection from insurance companies and group health providers
from either cancelling plans because the insured party is incurring, in the eyes
of the insurer, too many costs. If, for example, an employee paid into a
private health insurance plan through their company over the course of 20
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years before succumbing to a chronic illness like Multiple Sclerosis, the
insurance plan could not be cancelled or capped. This portion of the law
attempts to decrease the annual average of 700,000 bankruptcy filings by
mandating that insurers offer plans that will continue service, even if the
insured party develops an illness that will be more costly to the insurer than
the insurer would like, or originally factored into the cost of the plan.
The bill mandates insurance plans include minimums of care without
any additional costs (§2713). Certain procedures and services such as
mammograms, colonoscopies, immunization, and women’s contraceptives fall
under this umbrella (§2713 (a)(1-5)). This measure is designed to lower cost
through preventative medicine, which is cheaper, overall, than prescriptive
medicine. For example, less money is spent by insurance companies when
offering mammograms at no additional cost and finding breast cancer at stage
one, than would be spent absent of the mammogram where the cancer is
found at stage 3 or 4. In foreign health care systems, the emphasis on
allocating resources towards preventing illnesses before they occur has been
shown to reduce overall health care costs.
Within this section there was a point of contention from various
religious organizations. Not yet discussed, but the requirement of businesses
and companies of a certain size to provide health care for their employees led
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some religious organizations to assert their First Amendment rights to
religious freedom was infringed on by §2713. This was because some religious
institutions do not condone the use of contraception, and to be mandated to
provide plans where contraception was included did not sit well with some
organizations.
Eventually, an agreement was reached in which insurers created plans
specifically for religiously-owned organizanizations that do not include
contraception, thereby removing any mandate to provide coverage for
contraception. Insurers, however, must themselves pay the cost of such
contraceptive services to women in religiously operated organizations where
contraception is not included

[3]

. Under this language, religiously-operated

organizations (e.g. Catholic hospitals) do not have to provide insurance that
includes services against religious convictions, but should an employee of
theirs seek such treatment, the insurance company will pay for the service
themselves. That way; the organization is not mandated to provide insurance
for the service, the employee does not have to pay any additional costs or
fees, while the insurance companies pay for the service themselves [3].
A point of contention here is that now the PPACA mandates and places
cost burdens upon insurance companies, and those increases in costs will be
passed on to consumers. The logic being an increase in the up front costs of
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providing coverage for contraceptives will lead to ultimately greater costs of
insurance premiums. A study in the year 2000 by the National Business Group
on Health found not providing contraceptive coverage in employee health
plans winds up costing employers 15% to 17% more than providing free
contraceptive coverage

[4]

. Again, this relates back to preventative medicine

being more cost effective overall than prescriptive medicine; the medical
costs associated with pregnancy are greater than the costs of contraception.[4)
[Aside: I have written four pages on the first two pages of the PPACA
summarizing two components of the law. At said rate just this section of my
thesis would balloon to over 2000 pages. Understand this is a summary of
various aspects of the law, and I could write a thesis simply covering the
complexities of §2713.]
Other ways Title I attempts to expand coverage and quality of care is
by extending the basic preventative care measures and insurances plans of
dependants until the age of 26 (§2714) and a series of mandates that require
that the government work with insurance agencies to be more transparent
(§2715-2719). For example, insurance companies must make public how
much they spend on claims, their profit margins, and establishment of rebates
(§2718). This aligns somewhat with the Bismarck model because it establishes
limits on the profit margins of insurance providers. It differs because the
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Bismarck system has essentially non-profit private insurance companies, but
the PPACA moves the US somewhat in this direction by placing a cap on profit
margins of insurance companies, and when exceeded, the profits are funneled
back to the purchasers in the form of rebates.
Differing from before, customers can appeal denied claims and are
entitiled to have the appeal heard in an external review process (§2719).
Customers can choose their own doctors, and are guaranteed coverage in all
emergency rooms (§2719 (a)).
A four-year transition period was established at passage, but a number
of changes (including all in this paragraph) are set to occur on Jan. 1, 2014.
Under §2701, insurance companies are limited in the metrics they can use to
evaluate premiums to whether the consumer wishes to cover themselves or
their family, age and tobacco use. In this section, states can further add
criteria, but the nationally applicable version only has three. Insurance
companies must provide coverage for all who apply (§2702), renew coverage
for those who already have insurance (§2703), must work with all doctors and
hospitals who wish to work with them (§2706), must not have any waiting
periods in excess of 90 days (§2708). Perhaps most applicable to the overall
intention of increased access is the mandate that insurers can not restrict
customers from purchasing a plan based on (1) health status, (2) medical
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condition, (3) claims experience, (5) medical history, (6) genetic information,
(7) domestic violence history, (8) disability, or (9) “any other health statusrelated factor determined appropriate by the Secretary (§2705 (a)(1-9)).
Ultimately, if you qualify for a plan, you can get the plan (§1312).
Sections 1300-1343 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
establish certain regulations and establish certain protocols regarding the
formulation of health plans. Contained within these sections are methods for
companies established in multiple states to reconcile the differences in state
laws (§1333), a government assistance program to help with the transition
insurance companies will face (§1342), it allows states to create their own
plans as long as they provide the same level of care (§1332). These sections
establish rules and protocols for the functional interaction between what
must be provided and how to actually provide the services.
Probably the most well known aspect of the PPACA is what is known as
the “Individual Mandate,” which is contained under Subtitle F—Shared
Responsibility for Health Care. Before the individual mandate, §1501
establishes the logic and reasoning behind the mandate. Prior to passage,
United States Health Care spending was 2.5 trillion dollars in 2009 (17.6%
GDP), and was projected to increase to 4.7 trillion by 2019 without the
passage of the PPACA (§1501 (a)(1)(B)). Additionally, the economy loses 207
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billion dollars per year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of
the uninsured (§1501 (a)(1)(E)), so passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act reduces this economic cost.
One of the benefits of expanding the number of insured is to lower the
increased premiums experienced because of the EMTALA. As mentioned
previously, providers of care are required to give emergency care to all,
regardless of ability to pay under the EMTALA. Because of this mandate,
hospitals and other emergency service providers had 43 billion dollars in
uncompensated care in 2008, the cost of which was transferred to the
insured, increasing premiums by an average of 1,000 USD (§1501(a), (1)(F)).
Section 1501 lays the groundwork and logic behind the “individual mandate,”
and serves as a concession to insurers.
Without the mandate, people may simply decline to purchase health
insurance until the insurance is needed. If insurance companies are mandated
to provide insurance as mentioned in §2700-2708, the buyers must also be
required to have insurance. It was the ruling of the lawmakers that refusal to
purchase health insurance (if capable of doing so), is not solely an individual
risk, but a risk to the economy and health care providers. Again, the risk is
assessed based on the amount of money hospitals, insurers, health care
providers and taxpayers incur because of the mandate on hospitals from the
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Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) to give
emergency services (§1501; §5000).
The mandate is a tax on the uninsured, rather than a penalty, or
infraction/violation (more on this later). If someone is able to afford health
care, but does not purchase it, a tax will be imposed (gradually increasing
from up to 1% of income in 2014, to 2.5% in 2016) to parry the taxpayer risk
associated with not purchasing health care (§5000A). Employers with fewer
than 50 employees are not mandated to provide insurance for their
employees, but there is a penalty for businesses with 50 or more full-time
employees who do not offer health insurance plans (§4980H).
There have been concerns about employers cutting hours, in efforts to
prevent themselves from qualifying as having 50 full-time employees. These
efforts are largely in vain, as §4980H calculates employees based on full-time
equivalents. Basically, 100 part-time workers with 20 hours is the same as 50
full-time workers with 40 hours.
Title I is where most of the controversy and political discourse
regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act stems. Rightfully so,
the legislature in Title I alters the entire structure and financial landscape. It
places a wealth of new requirements on insurance companies, essentially
dictating how much an insurance company can make in profits, something
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contrary to the nature of capitalism to many. Furthermore, the law
establishes that “no man is his own island,” so to speak. By mandating
individuals carry insurance, the law (and government) rejects said notion with
financial and economic arguments. The argument was mentioned previously,
but illness is an unavoidable aspect of the human condition. If being treated
for ailments is guaranteed by a society, than those who do not contribute to
parrying the cost of such luxuries become detriments and financial cancers to
such a society, according to the law.
The individual mandate is the keystone of the bill. Without the
mandate, the bill would run the risk of not being financially viable because of
the burdens, or shifting of costs to insurance companies without adding
additional revenue for such enterprises. However, the individual mandate also
represents a possible infringement of the Constitution. The argument against
the individual mandate is the Government cannot mandate Americans
purchase insurance, or pay a “shared responsibility payment (§5000A). When
put before the Judicial Branch, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
law in a 5-4 vote

[5]

. The Supreme Court accepted the mandate as a “tax on

the uninsured” versus a penalty, fee, or infraction similar to a common traffic
violation

[5]

. The aspect of a tax is within the Government’s Constitutional
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powers, but the IRS, in this case, is “barred from using some of its normal
enforcement tools, such as criminal prosecution and levies” [5].

The Rest of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
Keeping in mind the scope of my thesis, I am not here to give a pointby-point breakdown of the Patient Care and Affordable Care Act. This section
gives the absolute briefest outlines of the next nine Titles in the PPACA, with a
small aside for the section involving Medicare Expansion.
Title II in the PPACA deals with the “Role of Public Programs.” Within
Title II is improved access to Medicaid (§2001-2007); enhanced support for
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (§2101); a simplification of
the

procedures

for

Medicaid

and

CHIP

enrollment

(§2201-2202);

improvements to Medicaid Services (§2301-2304); Medicaid prescription drug
coverage (§2501-2503); methods to improve quality of Medicaid for Patients
and Providers (§2701-2707); special rules for Indians and Alaska Natives
(§2901), and available maternal and child health services (§2951-2955).
Title III will be discussed in Part Four.
Title IV deals with “Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public
Health.” The basic principles behind Title IV are laid our in Title I. By adopting
different aspects of the health systems of other countries, the PPACA commits
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more resources towards preventative medicine, because of it’s demonstrably,
long-term, cost-cutting benefits that have been shown in other countries. By
increasing access to outpatient, preventative and primary services, the aim is
to spend less money on secondary, tertiary and quaternary care. Provisions
include modernizing disease prevention and public health systems (§40014004); increasing access to clinical preventive services (§4101-4108); creating
healthier communities (e.g. immunizations) (§4201-4207); and support for
prevention and public health innovation (§4301-4306).
Where Titles I-IV deal with the landscape changes, increasing access,
regulations and protocols, Title V covers the heath care workforce. Title V
contains innovations in the health care workforce (§5101-5104); increases the
supply of the health care workforce (§5201-5210); enhances education and
training within the workforce (§5301-5310); increases support for existing
workers (§5401-5405); strengthens primary care and increases teaching
capacity (§5501-5509), and improves access through spending (§5601-5606).
Mostly, Title V tried to provide incentives to increase the number of health
care workers in the primary care, preventative care, and community health
sectors because of their proven cost-efficiency.
Also covering the health care work force besides Title V’s increase in
funding, support, and access are regulations, which are covered by Title VI.
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Title VI is aimed at ensuring “transparency and program integrity.” The
section requires physicians be more transparent in various regards (e.g. giving
away

prescription

drug

samples)

(§6001-6005);

imposes

additional

requirements and standardizes the transparent disclosure of information
(§6101-6107); targets enforcement by adding monetary penalties (§61116114); focuses research on patient outcomes (as opposed to financial)
(§6301-6302); and takes steps to ensure the program integrity of Medicare,
Medicaid, and CHIP (§6401-6411, §6501-6508, §6601-6607).
One problem not yet addressed by the law is the future of the field and
innovative therapies, whose effectiveness have not yet been proven through
scientific rigor for insurance companies to be comfortable spending money
on such treatments. In order to facilitate patient choice, Title VII aims to
“improve access to innovative medical therapies.” This does not increase
access necessarily to clinical trials, but imposes regulations on pharmaceutical
companies so prescription drug prices cannot be gouged and will be fairer
(§7001-7003). Additionally, Title VII increases access to the 340B* prescription
drug program for children and underserved communities (§7101-7103).

The 340B Drug Pricing Program requires drug manufacturers to provide
outpatient drugs to eligible health care organizations and other covered entities
at significantly reduced prices (US Dept. of Health and Human Resources)
*
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Title VIII is short. It is the “Class Act,” which establishes a national
insurance program for purchasing community living assistance and support
(§8002). The enrollment in the program is voluntary (§8002).
At this point, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act has
established all of its reforms and provisions regarding the service of health
care. Title IX is entirely provisions for the sake of revenue; it covers how the
legislature will be paid (§9001-9017). Most people wonder, “How much is
Obamacare going to raise my taxes?” The only increase on income taxes is
covered in (§9015), which increases taxes by .9% on individuals making
greater than 200,000 per year. Title IX imposes annual fees imposed on health
insurance providers (§9010); an excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored
health coverage (§9001); an expansion of information reporting requirements
(§9006), and an annual fee on prescription pharmaceutical manufacturers and
importers (§9008).
Title X is the result of negotiations between both parties in both
Houses of Congress. It contains amendments to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act that is organized by the Title the amendment seeks to
replace, repeal, or add on. One of the criticisms that circulated around the
PPACA was that the elected representatives did not have enough time to read
the bill before they voted. This would have been a valid concern, but the bill
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had circulated for around a year before it was voted on, passed, and signed
into law. The changes to the law are contained within Title X, so any legislator
who wanted to know what version they voted on only had to look at Title X to
peruse the final compromises contained within the bill. And that is the Patient
Care and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
To summarize, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is aimed
at expanding access of health care to more Americans as a way to parry the
costs uninsured Americans impose on insured Americans. Additionally, the
PPACA seeks to move towards eliminating the economic strains of the
700,000/year bankruptcies related to health care, which is 62% of all
bankruptcy cases in America (§5000). The keystone is the ‘shared
responsibility.’ Other countries have more affordable health care, with higher
overall quality because the entire country shoulders the costs, and as a result,
costs for everyone can be kept lower due to an immense increase in buying
power.
Whether or not the bill will accomplish this; goes far enough; goes too
far, etc. - I cannot answer. Does the bill cripple insurance agencies? I can’t say.
The bill changes the national landscape of health care in America, that is to be
sure. However, aside from the individual mandate, the bill really just places
uninsured citizens who were previously in the ‘Out-of-Pocket” model of
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health care into the Beveridge or Bismarck systems; expanding the
percentage of Americans who do not have to shoulder the entire cost of their
health care.
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Part Five
Title III of the PPACA and Value-Based Purchasing
When I first began my thesis, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act had not been passed. Value-Based Purchasing was still in its infancy
in America. The program is borrowed from other systems, but before the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act there were only safety-net studies
in place designed to test out the program. Events advocating for the
calculated transition into P4P occurred from about 2007-2010

[1]

, where the

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began considering P4P
reimbursement methods for a variety of conditions [1][2].
After passage of the PPACA, Value-Based Purchasing or Pay for
Performance in the United States became law. Where in Part Four there was
an analysis of many of the main chapters in the PPACA, Part Five deals with
Title III, which aims at “Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care.”
Under Title III, Subtitle A, Part 1; the PPACA requires the Secretary to
establish a value-based purchasing program for hospitals (§3001 (o)(1)(A-C)).
Unlike some provisions in the bill, the VBP portion of the law is already in fulleffect, as of October 1, 2012 (§3001).
As mentioned earlier, one of the drawbacks currently with P4P
measures is the variability between different hospitals and the patients they
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treat. If a hospital deals with populations that are usually more ill (e.g. in close
proximity to a nursing home), then failure to meet certain required outcomes
becomes a problem. Outcomes in this case, could mean a cap on certain
“never events,” such as ventilator-associated pneumonias. To phrase it better,
P4P would not be viable if hospitals were punished because they serve a
harder population than other hospitals with better quality indicators.
To account for this, Title III of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act implements VBP gradually, in order to prevent any “shock to the
system.” For example, the Secretary of Health is granted the authority to
determine the procedures and conditions where there will be VBP, but the
PPACA only list five that are required to be enacted under the Secretary
(§3001(o)(2)(B)). The procedures that are required to use VBP in their
reimbursement are; Acute Myocardial Infarction, Congestive Heart Failure,
pneumonia, surgical site infections, and nosocomial (hospital-acquired)
infections (§3001(o)(2)(B)).
In addition to the gradual rollout of procedures and conditions that
warrant VBP, Title III includes efficiency measures that adjust any scores given
to account for factors such as age, sex, race and severity of the illness
(§3001(o)(2)(B)). Because it is in the fundamental nature of the health
industry to treat the sick and ailing, Title III makes concerted efforts to avoid
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penalizing health care providers for providing health care. After all, P4P
measures are designed to reward and incentivize quality care. Some of the
efforts

include

abolishing

minimum

performance

standards

for

reimbursement; weighting different procedures or conditions differently in
hospital score calculations; and rewarding the top performing hospitals with
larger reimbursement payments (§3001(o)(5)(B), which are distributed from
the total amount of funding saved through the improved quality measures
(§3001(o)(5)(B).
After the installation of a VBP plan, the rest of §3001 deals with
different measures involved with the funding of VBP, including studies to be
conducted, and systems developed in order to ensure constant progression in
the ability to treat various conditions (§3001(o)(7,11)). This reflects what J.D.
Nance wrote in his book, Why Hospitals Should Fly, where many of the
problems in our health system, specifically in cases of human error, isn’t a
flaw in the people within the system, but the system itself [4].
Nance draws parallels between the airline industry and the health care
industry, hospitals more specifically. In the past, Nance says the airline
industry generated a culture where pilots were thought to fit specific “hero”
archetype. A problem with the archetype was the burden and responsibility it
placed on pilots led to unavoidable human error[4]. To combat said human
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error, the airline industry began to implement rigid systems and protocols,
where if followed, would prevent catastrophic errors by having systems in
place to catch errors before they occur[4]. Hypothetically speaking if every
pilot on earth made perfect decisions 99.999% of the time without the system
of checks and balances, there would be airline crashes and mass fatalities
almost every single day of the year. On a mass scale, even errors that occur 1
out of every 100,000 times can be devastating to a system or industry.
The money allocated for future research of VBP systems, and research
into the development of systems and protocols designed to reduce human
error reflect a growing trend in the medical field. Similar to pilots, surgeons in
America have long been thought of as “artists” and are popularly depicted on
television as being unbelievably bright “heroes.” In popular culture, they are
the Dr. Houses, the Doogie Housers, and the Patrick Dempseys . The problem
with such a culture, as airlines realized, is that not every doctor is a television
hero, and mistakes are made even amongst the best and brightest. However
rare, mistakes by well-trained and qualified professionals happen, and Title III
tries to give health providers a nudge through VBP and the research,
So far, though, everything mentioned has mostly applied to hospitals,
and the legislature most pertinent to hospital administrators. However, §3002
of Title III attempts to improve quality through the improvement of Physician
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Quality Reporting. Any time poor performance jeopardizes the financial
bottom line of an organization, there is the incentive to cheat, or adjust
performance scores to portray a more positive image than what may be
factual in reality. In §3002 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
regulations are installed to create disincentives for physicians to improperly
report data. Amongst these are progressive penalties, where physicians will
only be reimbursed 98% of the amount they would otherwise be entitled to
(§3002(B)(i)). Losing 2%, may appear harmless, becomes consequential for
physicians because the annual total billed can easily reach well into the
millions.
After the increased amount of pressure to deliver quality, cost effective
care; an increase in research on systems where VBP could be used; and
regulations mandating data reporting, §3003-3007 serve as expansions on the
measures contained within §3001 and §3002.
Mentioned in Part One of this thesis, one question that was common in
considerations of P4P and VBP systems was whether to only reward and not
penalize, or to penalize and reward. The PPACA answers this dilemma in
§3008, but only for cases where conditions are acquired in hospitals. As
stated in §3001, there are various conditions and/or pathologies where
implementing a P4P system of reimbursement can improve quality because
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systems are established where the events should not occur. §3001 provides
only “carrots” because hospitals are still reimbursed the same as in a fee for
service or pay per service (PPS) system, but are given bonuses for achieving
certain health goals from the funds that would otherwise be spent on poor
health care. To simplify, because the P4P systems save money by delivering
quality care, hospitals receive bonuses that make up for revenue that
hospitals would otherwise lose when the conditions covered by P4P were
acquired. For the government, this measure does not and is not designed to
save money. For hospitals, there is no change in the money received when
giving quality care versus allowing conditions covered by P4P. However,
hospitals do save money on their overhead because there are less man-hours
and supplies used in giving the higher quality of treatment because of the
systems in place, giving hospitals a way to make more money, while delivering
higher quality health care.
Financial disincentives were given to physicians, but not for their
quality score metrics. The financial penalties in §3002 relate to errors and
omissions in the data reporting on behalf of physicians. The PPACA is heavily
reliant on data feedback for its various mandates, programs, regulations and
reforms in order to grow with the changes that occur within the system, as
the market and system itself changes.
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Alluded to earlier though, §3008 diverges from the financial incentiveonly approach, and implements a penalty, or financial disincentive, in the case
of conditions acquired in hospitals. For these conditions, there will be a 1%
deduction from the total reimbursement a provider would otherwise receive.
For non-profit 501(c) hospitals in large cities, it is not uncommon to
have revenues in the billions, while having margins between 1-3%. Under the
previous condition, a 1% deduction from annual revenues compounds into a
10% loss in margin. An avoidable 10% loss in margin places CEOs and hospital
administrators, whose job description is to maximize the cost-efficiency of the
hospital, in a hard position to defend.
Reimbursement of 99% may seem inconsequential to some, or not far
enough to others, but it’s important to point out the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act does not aim to financially cripple health institutions for
poor performance. The penalty is designed as a disincentive, and only applies
to afflictions and conditions that are clinically proven in health literature to be
preventable when adequate systems are in place.
On a theoretical level, Title III of the PPACA covers the bases in terms
of aligning incentives between the parties involved. The government remains
neutral in its budget forecast because the money saved in improved quality is
funneled to providers of health care as bonuses, and into research designed
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to improve protocols for the treatment of various conditions. Patients will
receive higher quality care for conditions covered by P4P, and know that
hospitals will be held accountable should they incur a preventable condition
as a result of their hospital stay. The patient is at the center of the PPACA
because they are the consumers and drivers of the system, but the system
also affects other parties, such as physicians, nurses, insurers and
administrators.
Physicians are harder to attest towards the impact of Title III because
of the added responsibility placed on them does not come with an increase in
salary. However, by following protocols and procedures for conditions,
physicians cannot be blamed or sued for malpractice when “accidents”
happen. This is because the actions of physicians cannot be proven to be
negligent when a practitioner was simply following procedural protocols that
have been established and replaced. By lowering the frequency of possible
malpractice lawsuits by establishing protocols and procedures for various
conditions, it is possible malpractice insurance could decrease for doctors;
serving as an indirect financial bonus.
Parts Three and Four have given a brief look into the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The law was designed to be implemented
gradually, and most of the research it mandates has not yet been published
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and released, as the bill is still (as of this writing), not fully implemented. My
analysis addresses concerns, aims, and protocols involved with the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. However, it is as of yet undetermined
how well the different aspects of the legislature will work together, and how
it will affect the health care industry, so I can’t make commentary about the
overall effectiveness of any of its measures. Anecdotally and qualitatively, the
bill replicates many of the more successful aspects of the health care systems
of countries with high-performing health systems. It is possible implementing
some foreign principles into our system will be beneficial, but it is also
possible that the fragmented nature of the American health system could
make any of the measures ineffective, as well.
In the next section, there is an analysis of how P4P and VBP measures
were performing and the effects they were having prior to implementation of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. It addresses the concerns with
P4P that were established in Part One, but could not be elaborated on
without first establishing the background information about health care
systems abroad and in America, the PPACA, and the statistics that evaluate
the American health system.
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Part Six
Conclusions
The final section of this thesis is a literature review clarifying many of
the concerns with P4P that have been mentioned throughout the thesis, and
answers the main issue of the thesis: does Pay for Performance increase
quality of care and patient satisfaction?
Addressing quality is the purpose of this thesis, but improvements in
quality cannot be purely assessed numerically. If P4P has negative impact on
access for minorities or physicians, the future viability of any P4P program
would be in jeopardy. Because quality is not the factor affecting P4P,
alternative impacts need to be evaluated.
In his primary research article, Has Pay for Performance Decreased
Access for Minority Patients?, Andrew Ryan assesses the frequency of patient
avoidance

[1]

. Ryan analyzed 100 percent of inpatient claims from 2000-2006

in participating hospitals to analyze if P4P measures caused decreased access
to Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) procedures to minority patients
diagnosed with Acute Myocardial Infarctions (AMI) [2]. , Ryan ran a two-tailed
t-test to establish if there was a significant difference in the frequency CABGs



Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) is a common procedure performed to
treat to AMI.
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performed when an AMI case was presented between different racial/ethnic
groups [2]. If there were a significantly smaller amount of CABGs performed on
minorities compared to whites where P4P systems were in place, then there
would be evidence of avoidance by hospitals.
Avoidance was a problem previously mentioned in P4P schemes,
where hospitals and/or would not give optimal care in cases where the
condition had a higher chance of hurting performance scores for the provider.
Because P4P is designed to improve quality, avoiding providing treatments
and certain procedures would be contrary to the mission of the program.
Ryan ultimately found a moderate (p=0.10) significance in the
frequency of CABGs, between different racial/ethnic groups. Because of
Ryan’s extremely large sample size, the lack of a significant disparity can be
interpreted applied in several ways. 1—there is no discrepancy; and 2—even
though there is not a significant discrepancy, the p-value is strong enough to
allude to a need to ensure avoidance does not occur. 3—Ryan does not
control for insurance coverage in his dataset, leaving the possibility that any
avoidance could’ve been based on insurance coverage as opposed to race. In
any way Ryan’s findings are interpreted, there is a need for more research
into avoidance in the case of the uninsured and cases involving minorities.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act places high value on data
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reporting in part to prevent avoidance. Ryan’s study analyzed data from
before the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
so the regulations addressing the potential avoidance problem were not
applicable to his study. The p-value in Ryan’s study warrants a replication of
his research in the future, once the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
has been in full effect.
Addressing the possibility of discrepancies in access of health care for
the uninsured, underinsured, and minority/ethnic groups is a big concern
among

hospital

administrators

[3]

.

Along

discrepancies, researchers Salamon et. al

[3]

with

concerns

regarding

revealed in their discussion and

compilation of conversations with over 100 hospital administrators that
administrators are very concerned about all P4P measures

[3]

. In their article,

administrators revealed worries related to the financial aspects of P4P,
reimbursement, long-term viability, financial penalties, frequency of
payments, and minority avoidance among other things [3].
The concerns of administrators have been mentioned before in this
paper as general concerns with P4P systems as a whole

[4][5][6]

. Many of the

concerns aforementioned were addressed in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and can be referenced in Parts Four and Five of this
thesis. While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act addresses
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concerns, the actual impact of P4P on administrations opposed to concerns
cannot be elucidated until 2016, when most of the studies and analyses of
P4P are mandated to be released, as defined by the measures contained
within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [7].
What has been said about administrators can also be said about
Physicians. In White and Marmor’s 2009 study

[8]

, P4P in Primary Care:

Learning from Success and Failure, P4P measures in the United Kingdom and
the United States were analyzed. White and Marmor acknowledged that the
amount of Pay for Performance measures in both countries showed
improvements in conditions where established systems and protocols were
established

[8]

. However, the authors used comparisons between the British

system and the United States system of P4P and found that the lower rewards
in the United States may have caused distrust in the system on the behalf of
Physicians [8]. Physicians in the United States caused what White and Marmor
explained as, “political ramifications” to the implementation of P4P in
America. Because the switch to a P4P system, doctors surveyed from over 100
hospitals expressed a general “distrust” of P4P systems, in part because of the
perception the systems are an “attack” on the work of physicians

[8]

.

Moreover, McDonald and White concluded that while there is an abundance
of positive reviews for P4P in primary practice settings, the context in which
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the systems have been implemented have been largely ignored by primary
literature, warning about possible negative ramifications [8].
Many of the reviews and input used in White and McDonald’s study
originated in the Great Britain, so there is a somewhat diminished
applicability in their conclusions. Additionally, their study focused on surveys
and attitudes of physicians in areas where P4P measures were being
implemented. Notorious for resisting change, there is the possibility of bias
within the surveys because those surveyed were being newly introduced to
P4P schemes. McDonald and White provide a convincing warning of negative
attitudes on behalf of physicians to implementation, but by neglecting any
performance measures I feel the paper neglects the fundamental purpose and
concerns associated with P4P—financial impacts and improved quality,
respectively.
Analyzing the financial effects of P4P; Werner, Kruse, Polsky, and Stuart
[9]

tested changes in hospital costs, revenues, and Medicare payments in 260

hospitals participating in safety-net Medicare trials for P4P. From the year
2002-2005, all Medicare claims regarding Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI)
were analyzed, totaling over 420,000 cases [9]. The study tested for changes in
costs of P4P measures compared to forecasted costs and revenues prior to
implementation. What the study concluded was a minimal impact on costs to
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both hospitals and Medicare after the changes were implemented for AMI
patients

[9]

. Because of the minimal impact on cost, the authors concluded;

more needs to be learned after the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act in order to properly determine financial stability.
The findings of Werner, et. al highlight a recurring problem in the
implementation of P4P, which is the lack overall of streamlined, consolidated
data that assesses quality indicators. P4P by nature encourages development
of systems for preventable ailments, but there is no system for evaluating P4P
that accurately connects the impact of the system on affected parties.
Additionally, P4P’s ability to lower costs have been shown to be minimal in
terms of overall cost

[9]

, so there is a cost/benefit analysis gap where future

research could clarify where P4P should rank in terms of priorities in health
reforms in the American system.
Despite varying conclusions on aspect of P4P, this thesis attempts to
answer simply if P4P systems lead to higher patient satisfaction and higher
quality of care. Unfortunately, dear reader 75 pages into my thesis, there is
not sufficient information at this point in time to evaluate either claim in the
medical literature

[1-4][8-9][10]

. If analyzing the British system and applying the

findings to the Medicare and Medicaid Programs were acceptable, then more
data would be available for assessment. However, to date P4P is still too new
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in America, specifically with the regulations contained in Title III to draw any
conclusions.
At the current time, there is a gap in statistical knowledge and
outcomes. As Tanenbaum points out in her article, Pay for Performance in
Medicare: Evidentiary Irony and the Politics of Value

[11]

, there is insufficient

data available in medical literature to prove that the decrease in preventable
illnesses is causally linked to P4P, despite the numerous studies highlighting a
correlation

[11]

. Ultimately, Tanenbaum shows current evidence suggesting a

correlation between P4P and improved outcomes for the conditions listed in
Title III of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act does not exhibit
causation [11]. To be concise, current data that shows improved outcomes can
not, as of yet, prove it was P4P causing the improvements, rather than a
natural improvement of systems.
In conclusion, P4P cannot be characterized as a policy fad after passage
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as it is now a part of the
American Health System. It’s effectiveness and viability will be evaluated in
the following years as more data becomes available and research funded into
discovering it’s effectiveness, but as of now, no body truly knows if the
program will be effective in America. There are positive aims within the
program, and is popularly advertised as a way to align incentives of providers
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and patients alike to meet the best outcomes. However, P4P still faces the
challenges of implementation, and a domino effect that could negatively
impact financial viability in some cases if proper systems are not installed.
Should P4P continue to be used in health systems? To answer that I will
defer judgment until more research is done into P4P. Currently, the industry is
focused on implementing the changes mandated in the PPACA and not on
data collection and compilation. Because of this, P4P and VBP are still too
much in their infancy as a program to offer any definitive insight.
Theoretically, P4P programs are strong, and offer a great way to ensure
ongoing quality of care for the conditions covered, however the devil can be
in the details. For P4P, much care needs to be taken into how it is
implemented in order for the parties involved to be advocates, and for the
reimbursement methods to ultimately work.
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